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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court erred by permitting evidence of 
Plaintiff's prior personal injury lawsuit and the amount of the 
settlement of that lawsuit over the objection of Plaintiff's 
counsel. 
The trial court's ruling regarding the relevance of evidence 
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Harrison. 805 
P.2d 769 (Utah App.) cert, denied (Utah 1991). 
2. Whether admitting evidence of Plaintiff's prior personal 
injury lawsuit and the amount of the settlement was plain error and 
must be reversed. 
When plain error is asserted, the trial court's evidentiary 
rulings are reviewed to determine whether it should have been 
obvious to the trial court that it was committing error. State v. 
Elm. 808 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence applies to this matter 
and is set forth in full in the appendix of this brief. In 
relevant part, the rule provides: 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated 
upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a 
substantial right of the party is affected, and 
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(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting 
evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears 
of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if 
the specific ground was not apparent from the context, or 
• * * 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking 
notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although 
they were not brought to the attention of the court. 
U.R.E., Rule 103(a) and Rule 103(d), Appendix 1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case arises as a result of a two car automobile accident 
in Murray, Utah in 1993. Plaintiff Debra Larsen was rear-ended by 
Defendant Melinda Johnson. As a result of the accident, Plaintiff 
injured her back. 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
During the discovery and at trial, Plaintiff disclosed that in 
1988 she was injured in an auto accident. Plaintiff further 
testified that she had physically, fully recovered from the 1988 
accident. Her treating physician also testified that she had fully 
recovered from the 1988 accident prior to the accident at issue. 
On cross-examination by Defendant's counsel, Plaintiff was 
asked questions regarding the legal proceedings arising out of the 
1988 accident. Plaintiff was asked whether she had filed a lawsuit 
as a result of the 1988 accident. Plaintiff was also asked the 
amount of the settlement. 
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Over the Plaintiff counsel's preserved objection, the trial 
court admitted evidence of Plaintiff's prior lawsuit and the amount 
of the settlement resulting from her 1988 accident. 
DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT 
The jury returned a verdict finding the Defendant was 
negligent. See Appendix 2. However, the jury found that 
Defendant's negligence was not the proximate cause of Plaintiff's 
injuries and awarded no damages. Id. The trial court entered a 
judgment for Defendant based on the verdict. See Appendix 3. 
Plaintiff timely appealed the matter. See Appendix 4. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. This lawsuit arises out of an automobile accident in 
which Defendant, Melinda Johnson struck Plaintiff, Debra Larsen's 
automobile from behind on May 12, 1993. See R. 1-5. 
2. Plaintiff admitted freely at trial that she had been 
involved in a prior accident in 1988 in which she sustained 
injuries and which required back surgery. See R. 360, 362-368. 
3. Plaintiff's treating physician for both accidents, Dr. 
Reed Fogg, testified that Plaintiff suffered significant additional 
injuries to her back as a result of the second collision. See R. 
503. 
4. Further, Plaintiff presented competent evidence that at 
the time of the second accident she had recovered fully from her 
prior injuries. See R. 490-492. 
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5. Defendant's own medical expert did not dispute the fact 
that Plaintiff had fully recovered from the 1988 accident based on 
his review of the records. See R. 713. 
6. During cross-examination, Defendant's counsel asked 
Plaintiff about the prior litigation and whether she had settled 
the lawsuit arising out of the 1988 accident. Defendant's counsel 
also asked Plaintiff to verify the amount of the settlement as 
follows: 
Q: Is it true that you received $172,000.00 in settlement of 
your claims in that lawsuit? 
See R. 441. See also Appendix 5. 
At that time, Defendant's counsel made the following objection 
on the record: 
Mr. Plant: Your honor, Just for the record I would lodge 
an objection for relevance. 
The Court: The objection is noted. It's overruled. 
See R. 441, See Appendix 5. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed reversible error by admitting 
irrelevant evidence of the fact of Plaintiff's prior lawsuit and 
the amount of the settlement obtained in that action. The fact of 
a prior suit and the amount of settlement in the context of this 
case are irrelevant, prejudicial, and should not have been admitted 
into evidence. Plaintiff properly preserved her objection in the 
record before the trial court. 
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The case law also indicates that admitting irrelevant evidence 
of prior lawsuits and settlements constitute plain error and is 
prejudicial on its face. Reversal of the trial Court's judgment 
and an order for a new trial should be ordered in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF 
PLAINTIFF'S PREVIOUS LAWSUIT AND THE AMOUNT OF SETTLEMENT 
AMOUNT BECAUSE SUCH EVIDENCE WAS IRRELEVANT, CONSTITUTED 
PLAIN ERROR, AND WAS HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL. 
The first issue to be determined by this Court is whether the 
evidence was admissible. See U.R.E., Rule 104(a). After that 
decision is made, this Court must examine whether there was a 
timely objection, or, alternatively, whether the failure to exclude 
the evidence was plain error. See State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 
1215 (Utah 1986); State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819 (Utah App. 1990). 
Finally, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the effect of the trial 
court's error was prejudicial, potentially altering the outcome of 
the case. Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976). 
A. Evidence of Prior Suits and Settlement Amounts was 
Clearly Irrelevant and Inadmissible in the Context of the 
Case Constituting an Abuse of Discretion by the Trial 
Court. 
According to the Utah Rules of Evidence, "Evidence which is 
not relevant is not admissible." See U.R.E., Rule 402. Relevant 
evidence is defined as, "evidence having a tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more or less probable than it would be without the 
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evidence." See U.R.E., Rule 401. Ordinarily, the trial court has 
discretion in determining whether evidence is relevant. Bambrough 
v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976). However, where the evidence 
is clearly or plainly irrelevant, the Court will be deemed to have 
abused its discretion. See Terry v. Z.C.M.I., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 
1979) overruled on other grounds MacFarland v. Skaggs Cos. Inc., 
678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984). The trial court in this case abused its 
discretion by admitting evidence of Plaintiff's prior lawsuit and 
settlement amount because such evidence was completely irrelevant 
to any issue to be weighed or resolved by the jury. 
In King v. Barron, 770 P.2d 975 (Utah 1988), the Supreme Court 
held that in a limited context a plaintiff could, on redirect 
examination, explain previous injuries and testify as to settlement 
amounts received in suits arising out of those injuries. Id. at 
979. However, the Supreme Court recognized that when the defendant 
affirmatively attempts to introduce evidence of prior suits or 
settlement amounts, the situation is entirely different. The King 
Court further recognized that most courts in other jurisdictions do 
not allow the evidence of prior lawsuits and settlements to be 
presented to the jury. Id. at 978. 
The Court in King cited with approval Worthington v. 
Caldwell, 396 P.2d 797 (Wash. 1964), which held that settlement 
amounts and the even the fact of a prior, unrelated lawsuit should 
not be allowed into evidence. In Worthington, the plaintiff was 
involved in an auto accident. Three years later she was involved 
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in a second accident in which she was reinsured. In the course of 
her suit arising out of the second accident, the plaintiff was 
examined by the defendant's medical expert. During trial of the 
second accident, the defendant's expert testified that the 
plaintiff had told the expert she had settled the previous lawsuit 
for $4,000. id. at 800. The plaintiff immediately moved for a 
mistrial, but his motion was denied. On appeal, the Washington 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial 
stating, "proof of the amount of settlement for personal injuries 
incurred in an automobile accident three years earlier was clearly 
irrelevant and immaterial as to the injuries sustained then and 
now, and, thus, had no probative value." Id. at 801 (emphasis 
added). 
As in Worthincrton, the Defendant in this case improperly asked 
specific questions regarding Plaintiff's prior, unrelated lawsuit 
and settlement amounts obtained therein. See R. 441. Despite 
Plaintiff's objection, the trial court allowed Defendant to delve 
into specific evidence of the previous lawsuit and the amount of 
the settlement Plaintiff obtained. Jd. As in Worthinaton, the 
trial court in this case committed clear error by admitting such 
evidence because the evidence was patently irrelevant and had no 
probative value. Cf. Id. at 801. 
In Defendant's motion for summary disposition, she argued that 
Utah Courts have "clearly and plainly affirmed the right of a 
defendant to bring before the jury the nature and extent of the 
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previous back injury, including the amount that she was paid in 
settlement." See Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Disposition, p. 6 (emphasis added)• Defendant cites Kelsey 
v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R., 264 Minn. 49, 117 N.W.2d 
559 (1962), also cited in King, as being dispositive. See King at 
979. However, according to King, Kelsey merely holds that "the 
plaintiff would be able, on redirect examination, to explain the 
resolution of a prior claim." King at 979. Kelsey, does not stand 
for the proposition that a defendant may, without restriction, 
introduce irrelevant evidence of previous lawsuits and settlements. 
Defendant has also argued that Slusher v. Ospital, 777 P.2d 
437 (Utah 1989) supports the notion that previous law suits and 
settlements should be admitted when they involve injuries to the 
same area of the body. Defendant's reliance on the Slusher 
decision is entirely misplaced. Slusher involved a settlement with 
one of many defendants in a multi-party case. Id. at 439. The 
defendants were all alleged to be joint tortfeasors. The Utah 
Supreme Court held that in such cases, the trial court should 
inform the jury of the terms of the settlement agreement with the 
dismissed parties. The purpose of the disclosure is to fully 
inform the jury regarding why the dismissed party is no longer in 
the action and why the plaintiff thereafter has an incentive to 
cast the entire blame on the non-settling parties. See Id. 
The Slusher decision is inapposite to this case on its facts 
and legal principles. In this case, Defendant is not a joint tort-
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feasor with other settling defendants. Moreover, the two accidents 
in this case are unrelated in any way except that the injury which 
the Plaintiff suffered is similar. Also, there is no dispute that 
the Plaintiff fully described the nature and extent of the first 
injury at trial. Therefore, there is no basis for a claim that 
Plaintiff concealed the extent of her prior injury from the jury, 
which might warrant use of the evidence for impeachment. 
A far more applicable case than Slusher is Nepple v. 
Weifenbach, 274 N.W.2d 728 (Iowa 1979). In Nepple the Iowa Supreme 
Court surveyed the case law addressing the introduction of evidence 
of prior lawsuits and settlement amounts where the plaintiff does 
not deny or attempt to hide prior injures. Jd. at 733. Nepple 
states: 
We conclude that the better-reasoned authorities hold 
that evidence of the amounts of prior settlements is 
inadmissible. . . . There was no denial by the plaintiff of 
any prior injuries. It is likely that the prior settlements 
included such items as loss of earnings and medical expense; 
and in the case of the plaintiff's tort claim, the additional 
items of pain and suffering. None of these would have a 
direct bearing on what injuries plaintiff had suffered which 
were still in existence at the time of the injury. 
The size of the verdict or settlement may vary according 
to factors having no bearing on the extent of residual 
injuries. For example, close issues of liability might 
diminish the recovery; shocking acts of recklessness or 
negligence might increase them. Disputed legal issues and 
other obvious factors, such as the ability of the claimant's 
attorney, could affect them. 
Nepple v. Weifenbach, 274 N.W.2d 728, 733 (Iowa 1979). Similarly 
the Court in Beil v. Mayer, 789 P.2d 1229 (Mont. 1990), held that 
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it was reversible error to admit evidence regarding the fact of a 
prior, unrelated lawsuit and settlement amount. 
B. The Objection was Preserved in the Record. 
One of the requirements for asserting error in the admission 
of evidence is a preserved objection on the record. State v. 
Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215 (Utah 1986). In this case there is no 
genuine dispute that Plaintiff's counsel specifically objected to 
the evidence based on "relevance." See R. 441, Appendix 5. 
Therefore, the objection was properly preserved on the record and 
may be addressed by this Court on Appeal. See State v. Carter. 707 
P.2d 656 (Utah 1985). 
C. Admitting Evidence of the Prior Lawsuit and Settlement 
was Plain Error. 
Even assuming that the objection in this case was insufficient 
to preserve the issues on appeal, if the error was so plain that 
the trial court should have known that the evidence was 
inadmissible, it will be deemed reversible error. State v. Ross, 
782 P.2d 529 (Utah App. 1989). As explained above, the fact of and 
amount of a prior settlement in an unrelated subsequent litigation 
is completely irrelevant to any issue to be tried. See supra 
section "A". The error is therefore, manifest. It would be plain 
to any court that the evidence of a prior suit or settlement is not 
probative of any issue, nor will it assist the trier of fact to 
resolve any dispute before the trial court. Therefore, it should 
have been obvious to the trial court that its decision to allow 
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evidence of the facts of the prior lawsuit and the amount of the 
settlement was erroneous at the time. Because the error was plain, 
the case must be reversed and a new trial ordered. 
D. Admitting the Irrelevant Evidence Resulted in Prejudice 
to Plaintiff. 
In order for an evidentiary error to warrant reversal, the 
error must prejudice the party against whom the evidence was 
introduced. See Downey State Bank v. Maior-Blakeney Corp., 578 
P.2d 1286 (Utah 1978); U.R.C.P.# Rule 61. In this case, the 
introduction of evidence of the fact of and amount of the 
settlement was certainly a potential part of the reason the jury 
found that Defendant was negligent, but not the proximate cause of 
the damages incurred by Plaintiff. 
The Montana Supreme Court in Beil held not only was it error 
to admit the evidence of prior suits and settlements, but that the 
error could not be considered harmless. In Beil, reversal of a new 
trial was ordered even though the jury found that the defendant was 
not negligent. See Id. at 1234. In this case, in contrast to Beil, 
the jury actually found the defendant was negligent. Therefore, 
the error in this case was much more likely to have influenced the 
jury's decision regarding proximate cause. 
The Nepple case also addressed the inherent prejudicial effect 
of admitting evidence regarding prior lawsuits because such 
evidence tends to cause a jury to view the plaintiff in a negative 
light: 
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Lowenthal v. Mortimer . . . concerned evidence of prior 
lawsuits by plaintiff. The court stated that "litigiousness, 
in the eyes of most people, reflects . . . upon character" and 
that "hostility [is] ordinarily felt against one who 
constantly requires services of a court of law for the 
adjustment of life's problems." The court held it was 
reversible error to allow evidence of the prior matters. 
Nepple, at 733 (quoting Lowenthal v. Mortimer, 125 Cal.App.2d 636, 
642-643, 270 P.2d 942, 945-946 (1954)). 
In this case, evidence of both the previous lawsuit and the 
amount of settlement were presented to the jury by the Defendant. 
As pointed out by Nepple, the evidence was prejudicial not only 
because it was entirely irrelevant to any issue in the case, but it 
tended to reflect negatively on Debra Larsen's character, which was 
not an issue in this case. See Beil, at 1232. This case, unlike 
King, does not involve a plaintiff attempting to explain a previous 
injury. This case involves a defendant attempting to affirmatively 
discredit a plaintiff by introducing evidence that the plaintiff 
had previously exercised her right to obtain relief in court and 
the result of that attempt. 
In light of the evidence presented by Plaintiff's treating 
physician regarding causation and the lack of evidence rebutting 
causation offered by Defendant, there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the outcome of the trial was affected. Plaintiff asserts that 
the jury was swayed by the improper injection of the prejudicial 
and irrelevant evidence regarding Plaintiff's prior lawsuit and 
settlement. Plaintiff has therefore, met her burden on appeal by 
demonstrating that the error caused prejudice to her and 
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potentially affected the outcome of the trial. Cf. Beil, at 1232; 
see also Joseph v. W. H. Groves L.D.S. Hospital, 318 P.2d 330 (Utah 
1957). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in admitting evidence regarding the 
prior, unrelated lawsuit and settlement amount. Allowing evidence 
of the Plaintiff's previous lawsuit and settlement was plain error, 
prejudicial, and was an abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
Reversal and a new trial are the only proper remedy for the error. 
DATED this £>^ day of August, 1997. 
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553 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 103 
ARTICLE I. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS. 
gule 101. Scope. 
These rules govern proceedings in the courts of this State, to the extent and 
with the exceptions stated in Rule 1101. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Adapted Rules of Evidence applicable in all instances in 
from Rule 101, Uniform Rules of Evidence courts of the state including situations previ-
(1974). Rule 1101 contains exceptions dealing ously governed by statute, except to the extent 
with preliminary questions of fact, grand jury that specific statutory provisions are expressly 
proceedings, miscellaneous judicial or quasi-ju- retained. Rule 101 also rejects Lopes v. Lopes, 
diciai proceedings and summary contempt pro- 30 Utah 2d 393, 518 P.2d 687 (1974) to the 
ceedings. Rule 101 and H01 are comparable to
 e x t e n t that i t vermita ^ h o c development of 
Rule 2 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1971),
 g ^ ^ o f ^ ^ i n c ( m i i 8 t t I l t ^Ih ihMB 
except that Rule 2 made applicable other pro- j ^ ^
 o f E v i d e n c 8 . 
cedural rules (i.e., cml/criminal) or applicable m, . . . - . , . .
 Qf , w.,,™, 
i- *«- +~ *u«
 A~+A~t+u«+ +u«„ ~*i— +ul w,,i«- T*16 position of the court in btate v. Hansen, 
statutes to the extent that they relax the Rules .f l f l 0 *\ 1flA m . , 1Q7Q^ f. . , , , , w ^^ . 
of Evidence. In addition, Rule 2 of the Utah 5 8 8 R 2 * l«f (Utah 1978) that statutory• pnm-
Rules of Evidence (1971) expressly made the ^ of evidence law mconsistent with the 
rules applicable to both civil and criminal pro- ^^ *"* t a k e Precedence is rejected. 
cee(^ngg Cross-References. — Evidence generally, 
Rule 101 adopts a general policy making the § 78-25-2 et seq.; Rule 43, U.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Bail hearings. Chynoweth v. Larson, 572 P.2d 1081 (Utah 
The former Utah Rules of Evidence were ap- 1977). 
plicable to and controlling at bail hearings. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evi- Biased Evidence Rules: A Framework for Ju-
dence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63, 68. diciai Analysis and Reform, 1992 Utah L. Rev. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 1983 — Part II, 1987 67. 
Utah L. Rev. 467. 
Rule 102. Purpose and construction. 
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimina-
tion of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and develop-
ment of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and 
proceedings justly determined. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 102 is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is an adjuration 
as to the purpose of the Rules of Evidence. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 
1986); State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 
1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments Utah Rules of Evidence 1983 — Part HI, 
in Utah Law, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 95, 130. 1995 Utah L. Rev. 683. 
Rule 103. Rulings on evidence. 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling 
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely 
objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground 
of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the 
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was 
apparent from the context within which questions were asked 
Rule 103 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 554 
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other or further 
statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was 
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making 
of an offer in question and answer form. 
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the 
extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being sug-
gested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof 
or asking questions in the hearing of the jury. 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors 
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of 
the court. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 103 is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is in conformity 
with Rules 4 and 5, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971), Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and Utah case law not involving constitutional 
considerations. Subsection (a)(1) is in accord 
with Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) 
and Stagmeyer v. Leatham Bros., 20 Utah 2d 
421, 439 P.2d 279 (1968). See also Bradford v. 
Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980); 
Szarak v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1082 (Utah 
1981). Rule 103(d) is a restatement of the plain 
error rule. See Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971) and State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 
P.2d 512 (1968). 
Cross-References* — Harmless error in ad-
mission or exclusion of evidence, Rule 61, 
U.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Applicability. 
Bench trial. 
Erroneous rulings. 
—Cumulative evidence. 
—Exclusion. 
—Harmless error. 
—Objection. 
—Offer of proof. 
—Substantial right or prejudice. 
—Waiver. 
Plain error. 
Purpose. 
Cited. 
Applicability. 
Adequacy under Subdivision (a)(2) of plain-
tiffs proffer of expert testimony was irrelevant 
where the trial court's exclusion of the testi-
mony was a case management decision and the 
substance of the testimony had no bearing on 
the court's decision, because the exclusion of 
testimony was not an evidentiary ruling to 
which Subdivision (a)(2) would apply. Berrett 
v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 830 P.2d 291 (Utah 
Ct. App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 
1992). 
Bench trial. 
When a trial is to a court, the rulings on 
evidence are not of such critical moment as 
when a trial is to a jury, because it is to be 
assumed that the court has, and will use, its 
superior knowledge as to competency and the 
effect which should be given evidence. Super 
Tire Mkt., Inc. v. Rollins, 18 Utah 2d 122, 417 
P.2d 132 (1966). 
Erroneous rulings. 
—Cumulative evidence. 
Even if refusal to admit photographs was 
error, no prejudice resulted to defendant where 
the evidence was cumulative and could have 
added nothing to defendant's case. Godesky v. 
Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984). 
—Exclusion. 
When evidence is excluded by the trial court, 
any error which may have resulted from such 
exclusion is cured when the substance of the 
evidence is later admitted through some other 
means. State v. Stephens, 667 P.2d 586 (Utah 
1983). 
—Harmless error. 
Where there was no likelihood that the testi-
mony in question had any substantial bearing 
on the outcome of the trial, it was not a cause 
for reversal. Stagmeyer v. Leatham Bros., 20 
Utah 2d 421, 439 P.2d 279 (1968). 
Admission of hearsay testimony connecting 
defendant with the crime was not prejudicial 
where there was other testimony connecting 
the defendant to the crime adduced before the 
hearsay testimony. State v. Gardunio, 652 P.2d 
1342 (Utah 1982). 
The improper admission of hearsay evidence 
was harmless error where the exclusion of such 
evidence was not likely to produce a different 
result. In re Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111 
(Utah 1982). 
Denial of a defendant's motion to suppress 
certain identification evidence was not a ruling 
upon which error can be predicated where 
there was other ample evidence of the defen-
dant's culpability. State v. Bullock, 699 ?& 
753 (Utah 1985). 
Trial court's error in restricting defense 
counsel's cross-examination of the prosecu-
tion's key witness concerning bias was harm-
less, where the jury had sufficient information 
to fully appraise the witness's biases and moti-
vations. State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 (Utah 
1987). 
Admission of improper impeachment evi-
dence was not prejudicial error, where the tes-
timony did not bear directly on whether defen-
dant did or did not do any of the acts witp 
which he was charged, and there was no tool-
cation that the testimony improperly tofl°* 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEBRA LARSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HELINDA JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
CASE NO. 940903949 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions from a preponderance of 
the evidence. If you find the evidence preponderates in favor of 
the issue presented, answer "yes." If you find the evidence is so 
equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of the 
evidence, or if you find that the evidence preponderates against 
the issue presented, answer "no." Also, any damages assessed must 
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 
1. Was the defendant, Melinda Johnson, negligent in 
performing any one or more of the specific acts of negligence 
alleged by the plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes z No 
2. Was the defendant's negligence a proximate cause of the 
injuries sustained by the plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes No /( 
-2-
3. If you have answered both Questions 1 and 2 "yes," state 
the amount of special and general damages, if any, sustained by the 
plaintiff as a proximate result of the injuries complained of. If 
such questions were not answered "yes," do not answer this 
question. 
Special Damages $ 
General Damages $ 
TOTAL $ 
Dated this l~J day of April, 1996. 
FOREPERSON f 
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Tab 3 
Andrea C. Alcabes, USB No. 32 
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
910 Kearns Building 
13 6 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 364-3627 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEBRA LARSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MELINDA JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
: JUDGMENT 
: Civil 
: Honorable 
ON JURY VERDICT 
No, 940903949 
Timothy R. Hanson 
The above entitled matter came on for trial to a jury with 
the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding, commencing on the 15th 
day of April, 1996, and continuing through the 17th day of April, 
1996. The matter was submitted to the jury on April 17, 1996 on 
special verdict interrogatories, which were answered in pertinent 
part as follows: 
1. Was the defendant, Melinda Johnson, negligent in 
performing any one or more of the specific acts of negligence 
alleged by the plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
2. Was the defendantf s negligence a proximate cause of the 
injuries sustained by the plaintiff? 
- 1 -
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ANSWER: Yes No X 
The jury was polled and the above mentioned answers were 
unanimous. 
The court having directed that a verdict enter in accordance 
with the jury's answer to the special verdict interrogatories, it 
is 
HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment is entered 
in favor of the defendant Melinda Johnson and against the 
plaintiff of no cause of action and the complaint of the 
plaintiff is hereby dismissed with prejudice/ costs to the 
defendant in the amount of ^ V7,i(a . & 4- , 
-2-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on April 23, 1996, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Terry M. Plant, Esq. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C. 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
j -
r~ 
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Tab 4 
TERRY M. PLANT, #2610 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 (84180) 
P. 0. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEBRA LARSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MELINDA JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 940903949PI 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Debra Larsen, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the final judgment 
of the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson entered on the 9th day of May, 
1996. The appeal is taken from the entire judgment. 
DATED this day of May, 1996. 
N, EPPERSON & SMITH 
>LANT 
Attorhey for Plaintiff /Appellant 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P. 0. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL, postage prepaid, this ^  day of 
May, 1996, to the following: 
Andrea C. Alcabes 
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
910 Kearns Building 
136 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
TMPtlrj/93-651.36 -2-
Tab 5 
A THAT WOULD BE CORRECT. 
Q OKAY. WOULD IT BE CORRECT THAT AT THAT 
TIME, IN JULY OF 1992, YOU WOULD HAVE SAID THAT YOU AVOIDED 
THINGS LIKE LOADING AND UNLOADING YOUR DISHWASHER AND 
PICKING UP YOUR LITTLE GIRL AND THINGS THAT MIGHT HURT YOUR 
BACK? 
A THAT'S TRUE. 
Q IS IT TRUE THAT YOU SETTLED YOUR LAWSUIT 
FROM THE FIRST ACCIDENT? 
A THAT'S TRUE. 
Q IS IT TRUE THAT YOU RECEIVED $172,000.00 IN 
SETTLEMENT OF YOUR CLAIMS IN THAT LAWSUIT? 
MR. PLANT: YOUR HONOR, JUST FOR THE RECORD, I 
WOULD LODGE AN OBJECTION FOR RELEVANCE. 
THE COURT: THE OBJECTION IS NOTED. IT'S OVER-
RULED. 
A (BY THE WITNESS) DID I RECEIVE THAT PER-
SONALLY? NO. 
Q (BY MS. ALCABES) IS THAT HOW MUCH THE 
SETTLEMENT WAS FOR? 
A THAT'S TRUE. 
Q AND YOU'VE HAD TO PAY SOME ATTORNEYS FEES 
AND OTHER EXPENSES; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A QUITE A FEW OTHER EXPENSES, THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q IS IT TRUE THAT THE DATE, THAT THE DAY THAT 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. (M*0 4 4 3
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